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公告 |
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Since the 1980s and 1990s
junshan0202 发表于 2012/7/21 16:02:00 |
Since the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico's economic policy concentrated more on industrial development and attracting foreign capital. The initiated a process of privatization of land (through the PROCEDE-program). In 1992, as a (pre)condition for Mexico for entering the (NAFTA) with the US and Canada, art.4 and art.27 of the were modified, by means of which it became possible to privatize communal -land. This undermined the basic security of indigenous communities to land entitlement, and former ejidatorios now became formally illegal land-squatters, and their communities .On 1 January 1994, the day on which NAFTA became operational, an armed broke out, led by the (EZLN). Their rebellion was directed against the marginalization of the indigenous population, the 1992 amendment to the Constitution, and the expected results of NAFTA, and they demanded social, cultural and land rights.
The government responded by of the region, and after 12 days a precarious was declared. These developments attracted a lot of international attention. While human rights organisations emphasized the of the indigenous population, (adviser to the Group of the ) stated in January 1995:"While Chiapas, in our opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican political stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the investment community. The government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and of security policy."Just 2 days later the Mexican army came into action to bring the Zapatista occupied areas back under their control, but they did not succeed in arresting or other leaders of the EZLN. To break the gridlock peace negotiations were started in March 1995 in the village of Moncler Online. |
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